Suppose there are ten different types of fundamental particles. There are therefore fifty-five possible types of two-particle interactions. Suppose fifty-four of these species have been studied and fifty-four laws have been discovered. The interaction of particles X and Y has not been studied because the conditions are such that they will never interact. Nevertheless, it seems to be a law that when particles X and particles Y interact, P occurs. Similarly, it could be a law that when particles X and Y interact, Q occurs. There seems to be nothing in local cases of particular facts in this world that determines which of these generalizations is a law (Tooley 1977, 669). The main concern for necessities is their ability to maintain their rejection of traditional reasons for believing that certain laws are contingent. == References == Sidelle 2002, 311) consists in the fact that they also distinguish between necessary and contingent truths and even seem to be based on considerations of imaginability to do so. At first glance, there is nothing particularly suspicious about the verdict that it is possible for an object to move faster than light. How bad is the verdict that it is possible for it to rain in Paris? Another question of necessity is whether their essentialism in relation to the provisions can support all counterfactuals that appear to be supported by natural laws (Lange 2004). Some advocate anti-reductionist anti-superlative views (Carroll 1994, 2008, Ismael 2015, Lange 2000, 2009, Maudlin 2007, Woodward 1992). As for the question of what it means to be a law, they reject the answers of the Humeans; they often deny the Huhmian supervenience, and they see no benefit in appealing to universals.
They reject all attempts to say what it means to be a law that does not appeal to economic concepts. Yet they still believe that there really are laws of nature; they are not unrealistic. Maudlin takes legality as a primitive status and laws as ontological primitives – basic entities in our ontology. His project is to show what labor laws can do by defining physical possibilities in the form of laws and by describing representations based on the law of counterfactual condition and explanation. Carroll`s analysis of the rule of law refers to causal/explanatory concepts. The starting point is the intuition that laws are not a coincidence, that they are not coincidences. However, not being a coincidence, that`s not all there is to having a law. For example, it might be true that there are no gold balls with a diameter of more than 1000 miles because there is so little gold in the universe. In that case, this generalization would be strictly speaking, suitably general and not a coincidence. But it would not be a law. What probably prevents this generalization from being a law is that something in nature—really, an initial state of the universe, the limited amount of gold—is responsible for the generalization. Compare this to the law that inertial bodies have no acceleration.
With this and other laws, it seems to be because of nature (itself). The treatment of Lange (2000, 2009) involves a presentation of what it means to be a law in the sense of a counterfactual concept of stability. The general presentation is complicated, but the basic idea is this: call a logically completed set of stable true sentences if and only if the members of the set remain true with a precursor consistent with the set itself. For example, the set of logical truths is trivially stable because logical truths would certainly be true. A set that included the accidental generalization that all people sit in the room, but agrees with the thesis that someone in the room shouts “fire!” would not be a stable whole; If someone shouted “fire,” then someone wouldn`t be sitting in the room. Lange argues that no stable set of nonomic facts—except perhaps the set of all truths—contains a random truth. “By identifying laws as members of at least one unstable whole at most, we discover how the law of a nomonomic fact is determined by the naming facts and subjunctive facts about them” (2009, 43). There are two reasons to believe that a law does not depend on a necessary link between properties.