At the second level, once the legal entity operates “in” the legal-institutional dimension, it creates a legal effect in a normativity dictated by the text by operations carried out with reference to the legal norms that make this possible, always subject to their challenge and the finding by a court that what it has done (or claims to do) is somehow illegal. The legal subject is an avatar that represents us in the legal form of life. At the first level, a “legal subject” that is not created by acts of performative discourse may not be institutional, meaning that the protection otherwise afforded by the interpretability and contestability of the textual norms underlying these acts of speech is replaced by something else. With the change of its bases, the baseline of legal protection that constitutes the legal entity also changes. It might not be a bad thing if the competences required for such protection were preserved, namely the capacity to possess rights and exercise powers, to be subject to obligations and to have them interpreted by a court empowered to enforce that interpretation. Only positive law can confer legal subjectivity: an autonomous car, a stone or a cat cannot have legal subjectivity unless positive law says otherwise. It follows that legal subjectivity is not self-evident, but a choice that is reflected in positive law. Beyond this balancing act, legal subjectivity, which allows textual normativity, allows us to “count as human beings” bilaterally. On the one hand, it protects our individuality (our moral right to develop a subjective view of the world), on the other hand, it subjects us to the normative order of law. It is therefore a framework of constraints that empowers and protects us simultaneously and in symbiosis. It is the interrelationship between empowerment and protection: the abstraction that protects the human being also allows a certain degree of certainty in the interactions between legal actors. It is likely that you will perform or receive, as in This memo is subject to misinterpretation. [End of 1300] The idea of legal subjectivity provides the framework within which all this is made possible, regardless of the content of the individual rights and powers themselves, which will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Without a façade capable of holding rights, it becomes easy to arbitrarily deny these rights to individuals.15 Legal protection therefore depends on the existence of a framework that retains these essential characteristics, by all means that can be made effective: in this case, the assertion of a “right” or the exercise of a “power” does not take place as an act of speech. which is based on the questionable institutional fact of a State governed by the rule of law. but by another mechanism based on a different mode of existence. Again, this is not necessarily a bad thing, provided that the content of the characteristics that give legal institutionality its normative value in terms of legal protection is preserved. Whether this is possible and how it is possible is a key question for design. Not all legal entities can act in the same way – they have subjective rights and different legal powers. For example, a minor or a person with severe cognitive impairment (both natural persons) will not be legally able to enter into certain types of contracts, such as marriage, or perform certain acts such as driving. The question of affordance therefore operates at two levels in relation to the legal entity. First, to what extent does the technological medium provide the institutional mode of existence of the legal entity? And secondly, what are the affordances of the legal entity in the legal-institutional dimension thus granted? The answers to these two questions are closely linked; The two are interdependent and cannot be considered in isolation. The second category of affordance follows separately, or perhaps in parallel, from the affordances of the text that make possible the institutional fact of legal subjectivity in the first place.
It is a provocative subject that is prepared for teaching. We have seen above that a central objective of the legal entity is to provide an abstraction that protects and submits at the same time: it provides uniform “interfaces” that allow the holding and enforcement of rights and powers, while ensuring that each entity is subject to the same system. What the legal entity can actually do is considered below in terms of rights and powers. But the idea that the subject and its institutional environment are co-constituted and even implied by the kind of things we expect from legal entities. Gibson`s idea of a niche can help us understand this: to be under the control or authority of, as in All citizens of this nation are subject to the law. [First half of the 1300s] SUBJECT, people, government. An individual member of a nation subject to the law; This term is used as opposed to the citizen, which applies to the same person when it comes to his political rights. 2.
In monarchical governments, subject means someone who owes lasting loyalty to the monarch. Empty Body politic; Green. Ev. section 286; Phil. & Am. on Ev. 732, No. 1. To whom and to what legal subjectivity is conferred determines the positive law. However, since the horrors of World War II, all people have been given a default legal subjectivity to ensure a minimum threshold of legal protection. The range of possible legal entities varies by jurisdiction.
For example, the classification of a multinational car manufacturer as a legal entity is the result of a start-up process.